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IdeaQueen

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Joined: 23 August 2006

Posts: 3152

Posted: 18 August 2007 at 7:45am | IP Logged

Indo-US N-deal not in India's interest: Karat

ibnlive.com

TimePublished on Saturday , August 18, 2007 at 16:43 in Nation section

 

New Delhi: The Left is in no mood to backtrack from its opposition of the Indo-US nuclear deal popularly known as the 123 Agreement.

On Saturday, General Secretary of the Communist Party of India -Marxist (CPI-M) Prakash Karat fired a fresh salvo following the Politburo meeting in New Delhi saying that they have not endorsed the stand of the UPA government on the nuclear deal.

"The Politburo of the CPI-M has not endorsed the stand on nuclear cooperation," Prakash Karat said adding that the agreement with the US is not acceptable.

Karat said that going ahead with the nuclear deal would not serve India's interest.

Karat also hinted that the government was in a minority on the issue of the nuclear deal saying that the majority in Parliament doesn't support the deal.

"It is for the Congress to look into the serious effect that this deal will have on the country. If the deal goes forward we will go for mass protests," Karat said.

"We are of the opinion that this agreement should not go forward. The government should not go ahead with this deal. We have to get into a deal separately with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)," the CPI-M General Secretary said.

Karat also said that he along with senior CPI-M leader and Politburo member Sitaram Yechury met Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Congress President Sonia Gandhi to discuss the issue. The meeting lasted for nearly an hour.

"We have gone and met the Congress leadership today to convey the context of the CPI-M resolution. We have explained to them how we view this agreement and how it is necessary for the government to look into this deal more seriously," Karat added.

External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee, who is working on reconciliation efforts with the Left, was also present during the meeting.

Karat also said that the deal was signed in a hurry and "unfortunately on the implications of the nuclear deal there is no consensus".

The CPI-M leaders also conveyed to the Congress leadership to look into the deal and get back to them with appropriate decision.

Karat dismissed suggestions that the Left parties were looking at the nuclear deal through a narrow mind.

"Nuclear agreement is not to be seen as a narrow party issue. It has to be seen in a wider aspect," Karat said.

He also said that they have told the Prime Minister not to take any step to implement the deal.

"I have suggested to the PM and Congress leadership not to take the next step in nuclear deal."

http://www.ibnlive.com/news/indous-ndeal-not-in-indias-inter est-karat/47057-3.html

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

    Is the Indo-US nuke deal really harmful to India?
    What are the profits India gets by this?
    How does US profit by this?
    What are the economic impacts on India?
  1. Will the left really withdraw the support given to UPA govt?Is it right ...regarding its opinions on nuke deal?

Your views pleaseSmile,

Regards,

Mythili



Edited by mythili_Kiran - 18 August 2007 at 7:48am

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Vinzy

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Posted: 19 August 2007 at 1:09am | IP Logged

Is the Indo-US nuke deal really harmful to India?

As per news report The left parties concern about...

The deal is in India's national interest and will not make India subservient to American strategic interests.
It is an equal agreement which does not compromise India's sovereignty.
It allows the country access to nuclear technology without signing the NPT

What are the profits India gets by this?

The only profit i believe,we get technology and fuel to India under a deal agreed upon by Bush and Indian Prime Minister ...

How does US profit by this? The deal actuly gain for American strategic interests...for three decates...
What are the economic impacts on India? Economicaly its not give much impact..but indian forgin policy will effect slowly...

Will the left really withdraw the support given to UPA govt?Is it right ...regarding its opinions on nuke deal?--CPI leader said 'honeymoon is over now the real life started'...so the clashes/debate/arguments happen...i dont think they will withdraw the support.Smile



Edited by Believe - 19 August 2007 at 1:10am

SolidSnake

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SolidSnake

Joined: 12 January 2006

Posts: 6916

Posted: 19 August 2007 at 2:50am | IP Logged

Great topic Mythili though I don't think many people (including me) know about it well enough. Here are two articles on this deal by noted Defence Analyst Brahma Chellaney:

http://www.asianage.com/presentation/columnisthome/brahma-ch ellaney/frail-deal-built-on-wordplay.aspx

Stagecraft & Statecraft | Brahma Chellaney

While the Indian foreign minister has claimed "all concerns of India have been reflected and adequately addressed" in the just-concluded bilateral civil nuclear cooperation agreement under Section 123 of the US Atomic Energy Act (AEC), Washington has asserted that the accord safeguards US interests "from a variety of different perspectives." In public comments and background briefings, the two governments have zealously sought to put their own spin. The true picture would be known once they unwrap the still-secret text. New Delhi in particular appears anxious to soften public opinion at home before releasing the fine print.

Two important points, however, have already been admitted by both sides - that the so-called 123 agreement expressly states that nuclear cooperation would be governed by "national laws" of the two parties; and that its text is within the parameters set by the India-specific, conditions-laden Hyde Act. As US undersecretary of state Nicholas Burns has bragged, "We're very satisfied because we know the agreement is well within the bounds of the Hyde Act."

In fact, US officials have gone to the extent of saying that the concessions they made in the fine print are more in the form of semantic guile than in substance, designed to help India address critics at home and seal the accord. The Washington Times, close to the White House, has quoted administration and congressional sources as saying that "some language is deliberately vague to help both sides save face" and that the text was "deliberately written in a way that can be interpreted differently by the two sides."

In other words, both sides can claim success, while in reality the cooperation would be conditioned by the Hyde Act, euphemistically referred to in the text as the applicability of "national laws." That is exactly what this columnist had warned in a two-part article last May 14-15 - that if the 123 agreement were to be in consonance with the Hyde Act and yet not rub salt on Indian wounds, there was only one way out: semantic subterfuge in the fine print. The reluctance to release the text more than a week after the agreement was concluded is a sign that there have been only semantic compromises on key issues. And US officials are saying so.

For India, this represents a major climbdown: having told Parliament that the Hyde Act contained provisions that were either "prescriptive" in ways incompatible with the July 18, 2005 joint statement or "extraneous" to engagement "between friends," New Delhi has come round to accepting cooperation with the US on the basis of the onerous and grating conditions in the US legislation. Indeed, in defining India's bottom line in Parliament last August 17, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had admitted, "We have concerns over both the House and Senate versions of the Bill."

However, once the US legislative process was completed without meeting most of the PM's benchmarks, New Delhi readily entered the next stage - negotiations over a 123 agreement - by pretending that Dr Singh's assurances to Parliament could be addressed in that process. That was just a charade to buy political space, given that India's deal-related commitments by then had already been expanded and turned into immutable legal obligations through US domestic law.

New Delhi was aware that even if the 123 agreement did not incorporate the controversial conditions of the Hyde Act, it would hardly free India from their obligations. America has always maintained that because such a bilateral agreement is a requirement not under international law but under US law, it cannot supersede American law. Washington has only reinforced its legal position by incorporating in the 123-agreement text the primacy of "national laws."

New Delhi indeed knows from its bitter Tarapur experience that a 123 agreement has little sanctity in international law. The earlier Indo-US 123 accord, signed in 1963, was abandoned by Washington in 1978 - four years after the first Indian nuclear test - simply by enacting a new domestic law that retroactively overrode the bilateral pact. That broke with impunity a guarantee to supply "timely" fuel "as needed" for the US-built Tarapur plant.

Now, New Delhi claims it has secured assured fuel supply in the new 123 agreement, and that in the event of any disruption, the US would find an alternative source. But US officials are already disputing that. The Washington Times has quoted officials as saying "the language does not commit them to do anything specific. Rather, if there is an interruption because of technical or logistical difficulties, they will try to do what is appropriate." That is in line with the Hyde Act which says assured fuel supply covers only disruption due to "market failures or similar reasons," not sanctions arising from India's non-compliance with US-imposed conditions.

More broadly, it should not be forgotten that only after India has complied with all the Hyde Act's preconditions that the US Congress would take up the final deal for approval.

And although the Hyde Act provides for an

up-or-down vote on a joint resolution - a practice that does not permit any amendment - the legislation's own explanatory statement reserves the right for Congress to "pass a joint resolution of approval with conditions" by giving up "the expedited procedures offered by Sections 123 and 130 of the AEA." That is exactly what happened with the US nuclear deal with China, when Congress attached three conditions to its 1985 joint resolution of approval, resulting in a nearly 13-year hold.

But before the final Indo-US deal can go before Congress, it has to secure approval from the 35-nation International Atomic Energy Agency board and the 45-state Nuclear Suppliers' Group. Even in the best-case scenario, with all the remaining hurdles being crossed, the US will perpetually hang the threat of re-imposition of civil nuclear sanctions to enforce India's compliance with the Hyde Act's post-implementation conditions.

New Delhi is itching to enter into a new 123 agreement without resolving the outstanding issues from the earlier 123 accord. The Tarapur spent fuel has been accumulating for 36 years. Washington has neither compensated New Delhi for the large costs it continues to incur to store the highly radioactive spent fuel nor allowed India to reprocess it by accepting that IAEA safeguards can be effectively applied at the PREFRE facility specially built for this purpose.

While the PM had pledged to secure the removal of "restrictions on all aspects of cooperation," including "reprocessing spent fuel," the US, under the new 123 accord, has conceded only a theoretical right to India to reprocess, with the practical right to be worked out in negotiations with the US in the future. India would build a new reprocessing facility with safeguards involving US participation. This not only prolongs the Tarapur imbroglio but also raises a larger question: why acquiesce to the US having a political say on reprocessing when the issue of safeguards involves only the IAEA?

Take another issue - a perpetual nuclear test ban on India. Through the means of a domestic law, America today seeks to implicitly bind India to an international pact whose ratification the US Senate rejected in 1999 - the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

Such a test ban, as both sides have admitted, cannot be, and has not been, diluted by the 123 agreement. Even the US "right to return" remains untouched. However, as the Washington Times puts it, "to help New Delhi save face domestically, the administration agreed to consult with the Indian government before taking any action in response to a test, officials said. The Indians presented that language as a major US concession, but US officials said consultations do not mean much in practice."

New Delhi should be fully cognisant of what it is getting into. It would be effectively embracing CTBT-plus obligations that no nation has done. Although the PM had pledged that India is "not prepared to go beyond a unilateral voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing," the Hyde Act seeks to enforce a tight, irrevocable test prohibition against India by actually going beyond the existing provisions of US law, which empower the President to continue exports on strategic grounds despite a test. By decreeing that the waiver for India will automatically terminate with any Indian test, the Hyde Act itself admits that it goes "beyond Section 129" of AEC.

Besides seeking "full and immediate use of US rights to demand the return of all nuclear-related items … if India were to test," the Act goes beyond even the CTBT by specifying in technical terms what is prohibited for India. In the CTBT negotiations, the US had successfully opposed an Article I definition of a "nuclear explosion" to leave open loopholes for "permissible activities" of the type it carries out at its Nevada test site. While refusing to accede to the CTBT itself, the US would be enforcing CTBT-plus obligations on India. Once India has imported power reactors worth billions of dollars, the Hyde Act will effectively bear it down.

Against this background, the debate on the 123 agreement needs to be conducted in a sober, realistic way, not through spin and hoopla. By papering over fundamental differences, the deal could engender serious Indo-US discord in the years ahead. That danger is already manifest from the conflicting analysis of the still-secret 123 agreement by official briefers. One US congressional official is quoted as saying, "The way the Indians are reading it is not correct from the administration's point of view."

Too often in its independent history, India has rushed to believe what it wanted to believe, only to cry betrayal later.

--------

http://www.asianage.com/archive/htmlfiles//Top%20Story/123%2 0%20text%20and%20context.html

123: text and context

By Brahma Chellaney

New Delhi, Aug. 3: The released text of the 123 agreement on civil nuclear cooperation reveals that the United States, besides upholding the primacy of its laws, has gained two absolute rights €" the right to unilaterally terminate cooperation with India at will (without arranging alternative suppliers), and the right to take back all supplied items and materials.

In withholding the text for two long weeks, the US and Indian governments sought to spin reality to suit political ends. Now the facts need to be separated not just from spin, but also from wishful thinking.

This proposed bilateral agreement has at least 12 important facets:

1. It confers on the US an unfettered and uninfringeable right to terminate cooperation with India at will. Article 14(2) states: "The party seeking termination has the right to cease further cooperation under this Agreement if it determines that a mutually acceptable resolution of outstanding issues has not been possible or cannot be achieved through consultations." That would put India at the mercy of the supplier, holding all the leverage.

Even though termination is to take effect at the end of a one-year notice period, the agreement explicitly empowers the US to forthwith suspend all cooperation without much ado. The only requirement is that a "party giving notice of termination shall provide the reasons for seeking such termination".

In light of the one-sided dependency the agreement would create, such a US right will not only help bind India to the non-proliferation conditions set by the US Congress through the Hyde Act, but it also goes against the purported assurances of uninterrupted supply of fuel and spare parts. Significantly, Article 14 on termination does not enjoin the withdrawing party to make alternate arrangements for supplies to the other side before it ceases all cooperation.

2. In a departure from a standard clause found in America€™s 123 agreements with other states, this accord does not uphold a core principle of international law €" that failure to perform a treaty or agreement cannot be justified by invoking the provisions of a domestic law. Rather, this agreement is unambiguously anchored in the supremacy of national laws and regulations (which means US laws like the Hyde Act, because there is no Indian law governing nuclear cooperation with the US or any other specific country).

Contrast this accord with the 1985 US-China 123 agreement, which in its Article 2 (1) states: "The parties shall cooperate in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this agreement. Each party shall implement this agreement in accordance with its respective applicable treaties, national laws, regulations and license requirements concerning the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The parties recognise, with respect to the observance of this agreement, the principle of international law that provides that a party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty."

The third sentence about the non-invocation of domestic laws is tellingly missing from this agreement, even as the first two sentences find mention. This omission is because of one simple fact: Never before in US legislative history has a law been enacted imposing such numerous and onerous conditions on an avowed strategic partner to permit cooperation in just one area as the Hyde Act does.

That is why even the agreement€™s Article 15, titled "Settlement of Disputes", is toothless, making no reference to the applicability of the principles of international law. It reads: "Any dispute concerning the interpretation or implementation of the provisions of this agreement shall be promptly negotiated by the parties with a view to resolving that dispute." That means the recipient state will have to listen to the supplier.

Both the US and Indian sides have publicly acknowledged that the agreement is within the legal framework of the India-specific Hyde Act, which reigns supreme in this arrangement.

3. While there is no explicit reference to nuclear testing, a test prohibition against India has been unequivocally built into the agreement€™s provisions through the incorporation of the US€™ right to demand the return of all supplied materials and items. India€™s unilateral moratorium is being stripped of its voluntary character and turned into a bilateral legality in this manner. Through the US "right of return", the 123 agreement explicitly hangs the Damocles€™ sword over India€™s head.

While the Hyde Act€™s Section 106 openly bans Indian testing, the 123 agreement reinforces that test ban both by upholding the applicability of national laws to govern cooperation and by incorporating the US€™ "right of return".

As part of the same design to enforce permanent Indian compliance with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty €" a pact the US Senate soundly rejected in 1999 €" Washington has already recommended that the Nuclear Suppliers€™ Group (NSG) link its proposed exemption for India to a similar test ban. The NSG exemption could even come with a "right of return" being conferred on all supplier states. In other words, the test ban under the 123 agreement is to be converted into a multilateral legality through the NSG.

4. The US has an unencumbered right under the 123 agreement to terminate cooperation not only in response to an Indian test but also if India, in Washington€™s judgment, fell short of the "full compliance" required of it by the Hyde Act with regard to other prescribed non-proliferation conditions. The 123 agreement does not in any way rein in the US right to unilaterally terminate cooperation.

Implicit in this agreement is India€™s readiness to honour the US-set non-proliferation conditions.

5. By conceding that the US has a right to unilaterally terminate cooperate and demand the return of all equipment and fuel supplied in the past, New Delhi has lent legitimacy to what is a dubious concept in international law €" that the supplier is at liberty to terminate cooperation retroactively.

The agreement states that before invoking the right of return, the concerned party would "undertake consultations with the other party". But that is nothing but public relations because such consultations would be of no consequence. The supplier-state, however, would "compensate promptly that party for the fair market value" of the items and materials it takes back.

6. While the US has the right to terminate cooperation at will and withdraw from all obligations, India has been denied the right to withdraw from all its obligations, even if the agreement was terminated at America€™s instance. The agreement more than once cites the permanent nature of India€™s obligation to accept international inspections on its entire civil nuclear programme, including the indigenously built facilities it is voluntarily opening to external scrutiny.

In a hypothetical situation, if the US were to terminate all cooperation and suspend all fuel and equipment transfers, India would be stuck both with everlasting IAEA inspections on its entire civil programme and with lack of access to an alternate supplier.

7. The US has also reserved its right in the 123 agreement to unilaterally suspend the reprocessing-related "arrangements and procedures" it intends to work out with New Delhi in the years ahead, once India has built a new reprocessing facility under IAEA safeguards. National security adviser M.K. Narayanan has already warned that "spoilers" may nit-pick on the facility€™s design and cause delays.

The text clearly shows that the US has granted India the right to reprocess only in principle. The grant of actual right would take many years, with the US retaining a veto on Indian reprocessing until then. It will take at least five years to build the new facility, after the construction of which, the agreement says, "the parties will agree on arrangements and procedures" for reprocessing "in this new facility". It goes on to say that consultations on such arrangements and procedures "will begin within six months of a request by either party and will be concluded within one year". Thereafter, the reprocessing agreement would go to the US Congress for vetting.

This entire process €" from the start of work on the facility to congressional approval €" would be a long haul. Yet, once in place, the US could terminate the reprocessing-related "arrangements and procedures" in yet-to-be-defined "exceptional circumstances".

8. The sugar-coated provisions in the agreement relating to "consultations" and uninterrupted fuel supply appear more to help India save face than to set out enforceable obligations. Although "consultations" are referred to repeatedly in the text, in no context does the agreement provide for consultations to achieve a mutually acceptable outcome. At best, it provides for consultations within a specified time frame in one context.

In all the specified circumstances, consultations are to be toothless and, in any event, subsidiary to the central requirement that the agreement be in accord with the provisions of national laws. The agreement gives India little say.

9. The agreement plays cleverly on words to fashion an illusion at times. For example, Article 5(4) states: "The quantity of nuclear material transferred under this Agreement shall be consistent with any of the following purposes: use in reactor experiments or the loading of reactors, the efficient and continuous conduct of such reactor experiments or operation of reactors for their lifetime, use as samples, standards, detectors, and targets, and the accomplishment of other purposes as may be agreed by the parties."

Note this provision does not allow India to build up lifetime reserves, as the Prime Minister had pledged in Parliament. It only permits fuel supply consistent with the efficient and continuous operation of reactors for their lifetime. This is just one example of how an optical illusion is sought to be created.

In fact, nowhere does the agreement specifically permit India to accumulate lifetime fuel reserves. The agreement is so cleverly worded that it refers to strategic fuel reserves in its aims and objectives, and then in Article 5(6)(a) it states that "the United States is committed to seeking agreement from the US Congress to amend its domestic laws and to work with friends and allies to adjust the practices of the Nuclear Suppliers€™ Group to create the necessary conditions for India to obtain full access to the international fuel market, including reliable, uninterrupted and continual access to fuel supplies from firms in several nations". In other words, the agreement admits that the US has yet to make the necessary adjustments in its laws that it promised in July 2005.

Then, in the very next subsection (b) of Article 5(6), it is stated as follows: "To further guard against any disruption of fuel supplies, the United States is prepared to take the following additional steps: i) The United States is willing to incorporate assurances regarding fuel supply in the bilateral US-India agreement on peaceful uses of nuclear energy under Section 123 of the US Atomic Energy Act, which would be submitted to the US Congress." But this is the agreement under Section 123, and there is no such ironclad assurance.

10. The agreement brings out starkly that India has accepted terms that fall short of the promised "full cooperation".

In keeping with the Hyde Act€™s prohibition on transfers of equipment and technology in certain areas, the 123 agreement offers this palliative in Article 5(2): "Sensitive nuclear technology, heavy water production technology, sensitive nuclear facilities, heavy water production facilities and major critical components of such facilities may be transferred under this Agreement pursuant to an amendment to this Agreement. Transfers of dual-use items that could be used in enrichment, reprocessing or heavy water production facilities will be subject to the parties€™ respective applicable laws, regulations and license policies."

11. In accepting this clause, India has not only acquiesced to restrictive cooperation, but also gone one step beyond its current policy to align with US policy on an important point €" that any enrichment, reprocessing or heavy-water activity, even when occurring under stringent IAEA inspections, is "dual-use" in nature and thus liable to be restricted.

This is the very thrust of the US case against Iran, with Tehran being asked to forego all IAEA-safeguarded enrichment or reprocessing activity, despite Iran€™s insistence that it is its lawful right to pursue such fuel cycle-related work under the provisions of the NPT. In seeking to forge an arbitrary new regime dividing the world into fuel-cycle possessors and fuel-cycle abstainers, the US has dubbed even IAEA-safeguarded enrichment and reprocessing activity as "dual use".

In addition to ensuring IAEA inspections on all aspects of India€™s civilian nuclear programme, the US had staked an unparalleled double prerogative: the right to statutorily establish its own end-use monitoring, as called for in the Hyde Act Section 104(d)(5)(B)(i); and the right to institute "fallback safeguards" in case of "budget or personnel strains in the IAEA". The fallback option, stipulated in Hyde Act€™s Section 104 (d)(5)(B)(iii), is to ensure that India is subject to intrusive, challenge inspections of the type the IAEA applies in non-nuclear states.

In the 123 agreement, the US has succeeded in subtly asserting its prerogatives on both fronts.

The provision for fallback safeguards finds mention in the agreement€™s Article 10(4), which states, "If the IAEA decides that the application of IAEA safeguards is no longer possible, the supplier and recipient should consult and agree on appropriate verification measures." That complies with the Hyde Act stipulation.

End-use US monitoring (to which India is committed through an earlier bilateral agreement on high-tech imports) is reflected in the agreement€™s Article 12(3): "When execution of an agreement or contract pursuant to this Agreement between Indian and United States organisations requires exchanges of experts, the parties shall facilitate entry of the experts to their territories and their stay therein consistent with national laws, regulations and practices. When other cooperation pursuant to this Agreement requires visits of experts, the parties shall facilitate entry of the experts to their territory and their stay therein consistent with national laws, regulations and practices".

12. While the US has managed to fully uphold all its laws, including the India-targeting Hyde Act, with New Delhi€™s own admitted support, it is manifest from the released text that the Indian government has been unable to fully uphold even the Prime Minister€™s solemn assurances to Parliament.

History is repeating itself. Ignoring the egregious way America cut off all fuel supply for Tarapur in the 1970s in material breach of the 123 agreement it signed in 1963, India is entering into new arrangements with its wings clipped (like on nuclear testing) as well as ambiguity or uncertainty on key issues. Even the actual grant of and continuation of the reprocessing right is to be contingent on India€™s good behaviour.

Creating a US-monitored energy dependency through imported reactors dependent on imported fuel through a fresh 123 agreement loaded in favour of the supplier-state is to ask for trouble, especially when the new 123 accord is not half as protective of Indian interests as the 1963 agreement.

(Brahma Chellaney, a strategic-affairs expert, is the author of Nuclear Proliferation: The US-India Conflict.)

SolidSnake

IF-Rockerz

SolidSnake

Joined: 12 January 2006

Posts: 6916

Posted: 19 August 2007 at 3:09am | IP Logged
Originally posted by mythili_Kiran

Will the left really withdraw the support given to UPA govt?Is it right ...regarding its opinions on nuke deal?

I don't think they'll bec'se for them BJP is enemy no one. They'll not do anything to benefit them, so they'll continue to bark.

Communists and their ideology, dono ne iss desh ka nuksaan hi kiya hai. (remember them supporting China in 1962 war, infact they still continue to support China...they also took money from Soviets as per CIA records).

Anyhow, am copy pasting this article from another forum...

The Telegraph, Aug 19, 2007

Problem is alliance with America, nuclear or not
PRAKASH KARAT

The Indo-US bilateral agreement on nuclear cooperation is in the eye of a political storm. The UPA government's announcement of the conclusion of the agreement has led to a political crisis.

It may be difficult for ordinary people to grasp the implications of the nuclear agreement with all its technical aspects and intricacies. The supply of nuclear fuel, the fuel cycle, the enrichment and reprocessing technologies and the safeguards agreement are all not within the knowledge of lay people. Without going into the complex issues concerning nuclear cooperation, one way to understand and assess the agreement is to ask:
does this agreement advance India's interests, does it protect our capacity for an independent foreign policy and sovereignty? Is this an agreement only on nuclear cooperation or is it part of a wider agreement?


Firstly, the nuclear cooperation deal is only one part of the wide-ranging alliance that the UPA government has forged with the United States. This was spelt out by the Indian Prime Minister and the American President in the joint statement in July 2005 in Washington. This agreement covers political, economic, military and nuclear cooperation. This alliance entails not just nuclear cooperation but talks of the two countries promoting global democracy, revamping the Indian economy to facilitate large-scale investment by the United States and a strategic military collaboration.

Prior to the joint statement of July 2005, the UPA government signed a 10-year Defence Framework Agreement with the United States. It is evident that without the defence agreement, the Americans would not have agreed to the nuclear cooperation. This is part of a quid pro quo.

Even before the nuclear cooperation agreement was finalised, the government began to tune its foreign policy to the strategic alliance with the United States. The United States held India's attitude to Iran to be a test. India responded by voting against Iran not once, but twice, in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

The first serious conflict with the Left arose when the UPA government did a volte-face on the Iran nuclear issue. The government voted along with the US and the western countries in September 2005 and was not even prepared to go along with the position adopted by the bloc of Non-Aligned Movement countries.

The Left parties have been watching with disquiet the way the UPA government has gone about forging close strategic and military ties with the United States. The Left came out in strong opposition to the Defence Framework Agreement. As per the agreement, India is taking steps to interlock our armed forces with that of the United States in the name of "inter-operability". The framework agreement is leading to various steps like the Logistics Support Agreement and the Maritime Cooperation Pact.

The Left has been vehemently opposed to the joint military exercises as the one that took place in the Kalaikunda airbase in West Bengal. These exercises were held despite the strong protests of the Left parties and the Left Front government of West Bengal. The years 2005 to 2007 have seen a sharp increase in joint exercises between the two armed forces. This is now being extended to the "quadrilateral" exercises as desired by the US with Japan and Australia in the September naval exercises in the Bay of Bengal.

Following in the footsteps of the previous BJP government, the UPA government has been deepening collaboration with Israel in the military and security spheres which violates our long-held policy of support to the Palestinian cause and friendship with the Arab countries.

The major pitch being made for the nuclear cooperation agreement is that it will help India meet its energy needs. This ignores the very limited contribution that nuclear power makes to our overall energy generation which is just 3 per cent and which cannot exceed 7 per cent even if the ambitious plans for expansion are implemented in the next 25 years. To make India's foreign policy and strategic autonomy hostage to the potential of nuclear energy does not make sense except for the American imperative to bind India to its strategic designs in Asia.

The bilateral agreement with the United States is going to be governed on the American side by the legislation passed in the US Congress called the Hyde Act. The Hyde Act expects India to have a foreign policy "congruent" to the United States. Every year, the US President will be reporting to the US Congress on how India is complying with the provisions set out in the Hyde Act. Though the Indian government says the Hyde Act provisions are not binding on India, it is binding on the future Presidents of the United States.

After the Hyde Act was adopted in December 2006, the CPI(M) had, analysing the American legislation, stated that it contains provisions which are contrary to the assurances given by the Prime Minister to Parliament on August 17, 2006. The CPI(M) had repeatedly asked the government not to proceed with the bilateral negotiations for the 123 Agreement, till this matter was cleared up. But the government did not heed this advice, too.

Many of the provisions under the Hyde Act which impinge on nuclear cooperation with India are not mentioned in the bilateral text. Already India is lining up with the United States in its targeting of Iran. Certain Indian companies have been warned not to export to Iran due to American pressure. The Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline will not proceed if this nuclear agreement is put in place despite protestations to the contrary by the government.

When the UPA government was being installed in 2004, a common minimum programme was drafted. When the Left was consulted, we had insisted on the deletion of a reference to "strategic relations with the United States". There is no mention of strategic ties with the US in the common minimum programme. But soon after, the government proceeded with forging a wider strategic alliance with the United States.

The Left parties have, after carefully assessing the implications of the 123 Agreement, demanded that the government not proceed further to operationalise the agreement. The objections to the deal have been spelt out in detail in the statement issued by the Left parties. The Left is clear that going ahead with the agreement will bind India to the United States in a manner that will seriously impair an independent foreign policy and our strategic autonomy.

A wise and expedient step for the government would be to acknowledge that there is widespread opposition to the agreement. The question is not whether it should be put to vote in Parliament or not. It is clear that a majority in Parliament is opposed to the agreement. The best course would be for the government not to proceed further with the operationalising of the agreement. Till all the doubts are clarified and the implications of the Hyde Act evaluated, the government should not take the next steps with regard to negotiating the IAEA safeguards, which are to be in perpetuity, and proceed to get the guidelines from the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

As the country observes the 60th anniversary of Independence, fundamental questions concerning our sovereignty and independent foreign policy are being raised. These are vital issues which cannot be ignored.

FROM THE LATEST ISSUE OF PEOPLE'S DEMOCRACY

-------

Left is still living in cold war era. They are still obsessively anti US/Israel. They don't care if it is beneficial to us, bas US ke saath koi sambandh nahin hona chahiye. Arab friendship my foot, they can go to hell....there was/is no friendship in first place. The Arab League has always criticised us on J&K and supported Pak so they can go to hell.

SolidSnake

IF-Rockerz

SolidSnake

Joined: 12 January 2006

Posts: 6916

Posted: 19 August 2007 at 3:23am | IP Logged

Another article by Mr.Chellaney in India Today

A Bad Bet Copyright: India Today Rather than chase a misbegotten deal, a rising India can get a better bargain in the years ahead GUEST COLUMN: Brahma Chellaney Behind the political storm triggered by the civil nuclear deal with the US lies deep-seated national concern over its long-term implications for India's security and strategic autonomy. The deal has divided India like no other strategic issue since independence. After all, the deal is not just about importing nuclear reactors for electricity. It will determine what kind of India emerges in the years to come — a major independent power with the requisite economic and military strength, or a middling power trimming its sails to the prevailing American winds and still relying on imports to meet basic defence needs.              India stands out as the only large country still deeply dependent on arms imports, to the extent that it has emerged as the world's largest weapons importer. The nuclear deterrent is the only strategic programme it has pursued somewhat successfully. While its nuclear posture calls for a "credible minimal deterrent", the country still hasn't developed a minimal, let alone credible, deterrent against its main challenge, China. Yet, New Delhi blithely put the nuclear programme on the negotiating table to reach a deal that implicitly imposes qualitative and quantitative restrictions on the Indian nuclear-weapons capability. India has already paid a very heavy price internationally for its nuclear programme. And the deal seeks to exact a further price, in the name of freeing the country from some of the rigours of US export controls. America's technology controls and sanctions approach were fashioned largely in response to India's 1974 nuclear test. Today, the main target of that policy has come full circle doubly. First, India has agreed to become part and parcel of the US-led non-proliferation system just when that regime has begun to visibly corrode. India is to "unilaterally adhere" to cartels that still exclude it from their membership. Second, in concluding a new accord under Section 123 of the US Atomic Energy Act, India has paid no heed to the lessons from an earlier "123 agreement", signed in 1963. In the 1970s, America had cut off all fuel supply to the US-built Tarapur reactors by enacting a new domestic law that rewrote the terms of the 123 agreement. The new, iniquitous 123 agreement not only grants the US the right to suspend all supplies forthwith by merely issuing a termination notice, but also omits a standard clause now found in America's 123 accords with other states — that neither party will "invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform" the agreement. India, gaining the right to be merely consulted but granting America the right to take all final decisions, has put itself at the latter's mercy.              Let us look at the benefits the deal offers. India principally would be able to import power reactors and fuel — and in the process help revive the US nuclear-energy industry. India, however, would continue to face stringent US export controls on advanced and dual-use technologies critical to rapid economic growth. Even for its civil nuclear facilities, India will not be able to buy enrichment, reprocessing and heavy-water components, however minor.              Now look at the price. First, India is set to replicate in the energy sector the very mistake it has pursued on armaments by sinking into an imports dependency. India is today willing to spend tens of billions of dollars to import overly-expensive reactors when it can more profitably invest that money to commercially develop its own energy sources. Second, such imports will be a path to energy insecurity, since the reactor and fuel business is the world's most politically regulated commerce.              Third, the deal's strategic costs are exorbitant. Like its conventional weaponry, India's embryonic nuclear-arms capability will remain subcontinental in range. To ensure that, India has been slapped with a nuclear test ban through a US law, with the 123 accord granting no reprieve. The US President is now required to annually certify to Congress that "India is in full compliance" with a long list of congressionally-imposed "commitments and obligations". India, for its part, has agreed to shut down by 2010 its newly-refurbished Cirus reactor, which produces a third of its weapons-grade plutonium. Nothing better shows the patron-client ties the deal anoints than one simple fact: While the US has an unfettered right to withdraw from all its obligations, India's obligations are legally irrevocable and never-ending. Even if cooperation is arbitrarily terminated by the US, India will still be stuck with everlasting international inspections on its entire civil nuclear programme. Little surprise thus that the deal has attracted increasing notoriety in India.              New Delhi needs to realize time is on its side. As a rising power, India could easily get a better deal, if it were patient and waited a few more years. Its interests, in any case, demand a deal not just restricted to what commercially appeals to America — power reactors and fuel — but facilitating an end to the full range of US-inspired technology sanctions.

The writer is a strategic affairs expert 

----------

I think ultimately it should be left to our experts and the Govt to decide whether this deal should go ahead or not though now it would be a loss of face for both Govts if the deal doesn't go through considering the time and energy both Govts spent on finalising the deal.

SolidSnake

IF-Rockerz

SolidSnake

Joined: 12 January 2006

Posts: 6916

Posted: 19 August 2007 at 3:33am | IP Logged

Whatever happens we must keep the option of Nuclear Testing open. We need to test a lot more to refine our nukes, other nuke powers have tested hundreds of times...

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_testing#Nuclear_testing _by_country

The nuclear powers have conducted at least 2,000 nuclear test explosions (numbers are approximated, as some test results have been disputed):

Over 2,000 nuclear tests have been staged by the eight or so nuclear powers in over a dozen different sites around the world.

Additionally, there may have been at least three alleged/disputed/unacknowledged nuclear explosions (see list of alleged nuclear tests). Of these, the only one taken seriously as a possible nuclear test is the Vela Incident, a possible detection of a nuclear explosion in the Indian Ocean in 1979 hypothesized to be a joint Israeli/South African test.

IdeaQueen

IF-Dazzler

IdeaQueen

Joined: 23 August 2006

Posts: 3152

Posted: 19 August 2007 at 3:35am | IP Logged
Originally posted by Believe

Is the Indo-US nuke deal really harmful to India?

As per news report The left parties concern about...

The deal is in India's national interest and will not make India subservient to American strategic interests.
It is an equal agreement which does not compromise India's sovereignty.
It allows the country access to nuclear technology without signing the NPT

What are the profits India gets by this?

The only profit i believe,we get technology and fuel to India under a deal agreed upon by Bush and Indian Prime Minister ...

How does US profit by this? The deal actuly gain for American strategic interests...for three decates...
What are the economic impacts on India? Economicaly its not give much impact..but indian forgin policy will effect slowly...

Will the left really withdraw the support given to UPA govt?Is it right ...regarding its opinions on nuke deal?--CPI leader said 'honeymoon is over now the real life started'...so the clashes/debate/arguments happen...i dont think they will withdraw the support.Smile

Thankyou beleive ji for the answersSmile

IdeaQueen

IF-Dazzler

IdeaQueen

Joined: 23 August 2006

Posts: 3152

Posted: 19 August 2007 at 3:51am | IP Logged

Deepak ! First of all let me thankyou for posting the wonderful articles..I'm very curious to know about the issues related to this deal.and unfortunately..no one of my aquaintance has idea about this and I did'nt get good resources even to read about them..Thankyou once again for posting these.Hope all the forum friends read them..as they too might not have much idea about this..nuke dealSmile

PS: what is Shreya doing in your signatureWinkTongue

Check this shreya site..in this apart from her walpapers..there are her Quotes also..this quotes made me interesting!SmileLOL. A good telugu actor....who came into the hands of Emran Hashimi..however..awarapan is a decent movie because of ShreyaSmile

http://www.shriya4u.com/shriya-trivia.html



Edited by mythili_Kiran - 19 August 2007 at 3:53am

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